









Why retributivists have a reason to punish repeat offenders less harshly than first-time offenders  






About 80 % of all convicted have had a prior record of conviction.​[1]​ But how should the state punish repeat offenders (with a prior conviction) as compared with first-time offenders who are convicted? The law in all jurisdictions,​[2]​ a large swathe of public opinion,​[3]​ and the general trend within criminal justice ethics all seem to accept what we may call:

Asymmetry A
The punishment of repeat offenders should be harsher than the punishment of first-time offenders.

This asymmetry is obviously just a rough structure. It leaves a lot of room for interpretation. Several retributivists have argued for progressive loss of mitigation (PLM). On this view, a first-time offender receives a discount on punishment that is gradually lost if he re-offends. When the discount is lost the offender receives the full punishment, and re-offending from that point on will be punished equally.​[4]​ However, recently some retributivists have argued in favour of a cumulative principle (CP) according to which an offender will progressively be punished more severely the more convictions he has accumulated.​[5]​ In sum, in the theoretical literature on the subject, Asymmetry A has been the mantra for several prominent retributivists.​[6]​
The aim of this paper is to point to an all but overlooked logical point in the discussion of punishment and recidivism. This is the point that it follows, from retributivism, that there is a reason - at least in some situations, as we shall see - to support what we may call:

Asymmetry B
The punishment of repeat offenders should be more lenient than the punishment of first-time offenders.​[7]​


In the next section I will present and clarify the argument linking retributivism and the notion that there is a morally relevant difference between some first-time criminals and some repeat offender which can be used to justify the claim that some repeat offenders should be punished more leniently than some first-time offenders. In Section 3, I will critically discuss four objections that can be raised against this argument. 
The relevance of this paper ought to be plain enough. To my knowledge, no one in the literature has discussed a retributivist justification favouring the idea that there exists a reason according to which recidivists should be punished less harshly.​[8]​ 

AN ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF ASYMMETRY B

In this section I will briefly present the core of an argument that, in some situations, supports Asymmetry B. I shall then flesh out the premises and explain the motivation behind them in a little more detail. The argument runs as follows:

P1 If recidivists are less culpable for their criminal actions than first-time criminals, then (for retributivists, at least) there is a reason to punish recidivists less harshly than first-time criminals.

P2 Recidivists are less culpable for their criminal actions than first-time criminals if, unlike first-timers, they do not have enough valuable opportunities to live a non-criminal life.

P3 Some recidivists, in contrast with some first-timers, do not have enough valuable opportunities to live a non-criminal life, as a result, for example, of a) the social stigmatization that often attaches to being convicted and punished, b) certain, in effect, punitive laws (e.g. legal disqualifications and the possibility for employers to have access to criminal records), and c) lack of education during imprisonment, and other ‘in-jail’ experiences.

Conclusion: Therefore, retributivists have a reason to punish some recidivists less harshly than some first-time criminals.

Let me briefly clarify these premises and emphasize why they find a natural home within retributivism.

First of all, if we acknowledge retributivism that is based on the idea that a criminal deserves to be punished, it seems natural to say that a person only deserves a punishment if he is somehow culpable for the crime. It would be odd to say that a person deserves to be punished for an act and yet was not culpable at all.
But what is meant by the phrase “… if they … do not have enough valuable opportunities” in P2? It is of course difficult to answer this question with any precision. But the idea is roughly that there exist a threshold of enough valuable opportunities from which it follows that if you are below that threshold you are less culpable than individuals who are above or at the threshold.  And if you are less culpable, this is a mitigating factor in measuring out your punishment. However, we need not answer in detail (a somewhat brief discussion of this question is though the subject of section 3.1) just which and how few opportunities you ought to have in order to be less culpable. We can just accept, or point out, that it is a rough view that most retributivists would accept. Recall that the primary purpose in proposing this argument is a logical one: I wish to show that if you are a retributivist, it will follow that you have a reason to punish some repeat offenders less harshly than some first-timers. Let us, as a point of departure, take it for granted that when social factors make a person’s prospects of leading a non-criminal life rather limited, these factors should play a mitigating role in sentencing decisions. This fits well with leading retributivists:

… We would hardly want to blame fully those who lack opportunities for basic life prospects when they turn to crime. To be sure, poverty alone is no excuse, legally speaking, for crime. But certain circumstances of poverty and lack of opportunity might serve as factors of mitigation in sentencing offenders.​[9]​







In these passages it is clear that factors like poverty and lack of opportunity are indeed allowed, by retributivists, to play a mitigating role when it comes to punishment in general. And the reason for this, I presume, is that these factors are often beyond the control of the person being punished. Although, the words “… certain circumstance of poverty and lack of opportunities ...” are vague, I believe that a reasonable understanding of this view supports my argument in the following way. It seems fair to say that, other things being equal, recidivists are on average subjected to negative social factors (e.g. poverty, limited job opportunities, low levels of wealth and, therefore, impaired health) more than first-time criminals. Furthermore, it seems obvious that the cause of this has to do, at least partly, with the formal and informal punishment of the offender. It is obvious that these factors narrow the number of valuable opportunities available – and that these social factors to a certain extent are beyond the control of the offender. If this is true, retributivists have a stronger reason to respond to pleas of mitigation made by, or on behalf of, recidivists than they have to respond to similar pleas made by first-timers. 
P3 refers to ‘some repeat offenders’ and ‘some first time offenders’ for two reasons. First of all, not all convicted and sentenced repeat-offenders are harmed by stigmatization, disqualifications, poor job opportunities, and the like. Not all recidivists ‘lack opportunities for basic life prospects when they again turn to crime’ then. A person ordered to pay a small fine will not suffer from in-jail experiences, obviously, and he might find that he is able to obtain a job as easily as before. On the other hand, for some individuals a fine on ones criminal record can be devastating for ones prospects of getting a job. Secondly, as some first timers may not have enough valuable opportunities whereas some second time offenders could be above the threshold - it will only follow from retributivism, that (all else being equal) repeat offenders under the threshold should be punished more leniently that first timers that are at the threshold or above. 




In what follows I will present and critically discuss four objections.
3.1 Recidivists do have enough valuable opportunities!
Retributivists could accept that the factors mentioned in P3 can be mitigating, but at the same time insist that in most cases repeat offenders do have enough valuable opportunities, and that this makes them culpable for their crimes. In support of this objection, this kind of retributivist might observe that people who are very much like recidivists (e.g. socially and economically) often live within the limits of the law. Indeed there is evidence that approximately 70 % of first-time offenders are not convicted of repeat offences within two years of their release from prison.​[11]​ On the other hand other studies have shown that in the US and UK only about 30 % of first-time offenders are not convicted of repeat offences within 3 years of their arrest.​[12]​ So in sum, the situation is that far from all individuals with a prior conviction become repeat offenders, and this shows (the proponent of this line continues) that there are enough valuable opportunities out there for first-time offenders to resists re-offending.
However, there are several reasons for persisting with P3 and continuing to hold that repeat offenders, all else being equal, have fewer and inadequate, valuable opportunities as compared with first-time offenders. First of all, those who become repeat offenders are usually also those who have received the longest sentences for their first crime and therefore have been more exposed to the adverse effects of formal and informal punishment than non-recidivists. Secondly, even if some individuals do manage not to offend again, it may well be true for some individuals (most probably, those receiving severe punishment) that the formal as well as the informal punishment tips the scale in such a way that not enough valuable opportunities are available after they have done their sentencing. Thirdly, the fact that we praise ex-convicts for staying out of crime might be said to reflect the reasonableness of ascribing repeat offenders less culpability for their crimes. For, at least one reason for praising ex-convicts is because we believe that, against all odds, they have done something extraordinary. 
I shall now seek to support P3 in a more straightforward fashion. Consider the following list. If you were sentenced for a felony (or even a minor crime) in the US, these would be some of the consequences you might have to deal with on leaving jail as a ‘free man’:​[13]​
a. You would be banned from many public jobs (e.g. in the police force, the prison service, childcare, publicly funded schools, government departments and the courts of law).​[14]​
b. You would have serious difficulty getting a job (especially a well paid one), because many organizations and commercial companies expect all their applicants and employees to possess a clean criminal record. 
c. You would be excluded from social benefits such as public housing, or denied other welfare assistance such as student loans, for a ten year period.​[15]​
d. You would lose your right to vote and your eligibility to stand for several kinds of political post – either for a period or permanently.
e. You would lose your driving licence.
f. You would not be allowed to adopt or obtain access to assisted reproduction.
g. You would have difficulty obtaining a visa in order to visit certain countries or to obtain your wanted citizenship. 
Recall that this list only mentions some of the valuable opportunities that are lost following release from prison. Once you are sentenced, it is also more likely that you will be denied the possibilities of (i) bail, (ii) early release, (iii) parole and (iv) custodial sentence at home; and on top of that you will receive (v) a ‘recidivists premium’ if you are convicted and sentenced in the future. Moreover, we can add to all of this the fact that, during his formal punishment (e.g. 12 months in prison), a prisoner may very well be harmed in a way that will make him less capable of making effective use of any valuable opportunities that come his way. The harm might involve becoming acquainted with, and dependent on, other offenders, being taught about criminal tricks, easy access to drugs, a higher chance of being attacked or beaten, being blackmailed or raped, and so on. All of these kinds of harm are readily seen to affect life in a negative way during imprisonment, of course; but they can also affect the prisoner’s well-being long after he has been released from prison.

3.2 The immorality of the negative effects of punishment. 
Advocates of retributivism could, from a moral viewpoint, be against all the above-mentioned effects on people with prior convictions. Furthermore, if there were no such effects then they could argue that we would not have a reason in favour of the claim that recidivists should receive a less harsh treatment. Such advocates might claim that ideally recidivists should not receive less harsh punishment, since most of the negative effects of punishment (e.g. the general and exclusive way criminal records are used on most labour markets) ought not to exist at all. 
However, this objection is out of touch both with human psychology and with what is morally plausible. In our more or less formal understanding of human psychology, we all know that certain factors that decrease the number of valuable opportunities for prior offenders (e.g. stigmatization) cannot, in practice, be reversed. So even though retributivists are against informal punishment, criminals will probably still have less hope, or fewer opportunities, because of the inevitable negative (and informal) effects of formal punishment.
Looking at matters from the moral perspective, the problem with the suggestion that informal punishments should be countered, or annulled, is obvious. Although it can readily be argued that we should change the current practice of some informal punishments – the use of criminal records on the labour market and disqualifications, such as those limiting access to public jobs, or the loss of one’s driving licence and the right to vote, come to mind – we should not be entirely against the use of e.g. criminal records on the labour market. That an applicant for a job at a childcare centre should be obliged to show a criminal record free from convictions for crimes involving violence toward children is obvious. However, it remains unclear why a person who has been convicted for driving too fast should show a clean criminal record when applying for a job which does not involve driving. However, if current laws on the use of criminal records cannot be defended in a morally satisfying way, we shall have even less reason to punish recidivists more harshly – less reason, because they have already been punished (informally) more than they deserve.
3.3 What if ‘punishment’ gives more valuable opportunities for repeat offenders?
Thirdly, one could suggest that the conclusion of my argument has some morally problematic implications. For example, what do we want to say about the recidivist who receives more valuable opportunities because he was punished for his first offence?​[16]​ Would we have a reason to punish him more harshly than other criminals (first-timers as well as other recidivists who have not received more opportunities)? Obviously, the answer to this question must be ‘yes’, at least, if retributivism is assumed. Thus, if a criminal has been through a rehabilitation programme of the kind that gives attendees more valuable opportunities, it could very well be said that he is more culpable for his second crime, as he is better equipped to act lawfully than he was before he was punished for his first offence. However, it is of course not very likely that a punished person would be presented by more valuable opportunities as a result of his punishment. Even if we admit that it might happen – and it should be noted that some murderers and other convicts on death row receive a lot of love letters and marriage proposals, so we are not entering the realms of wholly fanciful speculation here – this will, in the average case, not be the right description of the effect of punishment.

3.4 The tracing back of moral responsibility​[17]​
Finally, a point that I consider to present the most serious objection to the argument made in Section 2: retributivists could argue that, even if a repeat offender had no opportunities at time t2, and therefore could not help committing a second crime due to the formal and informal punishment of his first crime, this will not change the fact that he is responsible for the crime he commits at t2​[18]​ because the responsibility can be traced back to the time prior to t2.​[19]​ Imagine a person who at t0 is in sufficient control of what he does, and who knows that committing a crime at t1 is both morally wrong and will probably lead to conviction and punishment. Imagine that this person also knows that, if he commits the first offence at t1 and is convicted and punished, his chance of offending at t2 will be greater than it would otherwise be. Furthermore, imagine that he commits a crime at t1. If this is true it seems fair to say that at t0 not only is he to be responsibly for the offence done at t1, but he is also to be responsible for what he does at t2.​[20]​ This remains true even if at t2 he is not sufficiently in control of what he is doing at t2 because he has not enough valuable opportunities to choose from in order to stay out of crime. To clarify this kind of reasoning, imagine that I, at t0, eat a pill that I know will, at t1, force me to commit a minor crime and at t2 will force me to commit a violent, very harmful crime. If this is true, it seems obvious to say, that if I am to be morally responsible for eating the pill at t0, then I am also culpable for the offences I commit at t1 and t2.
On reflection, I think we should be reluctant to accept that this way of reasoning can be used to support the view that the culpability of repeat offenders can be traced back to a time prior to the repeat offence. First of all, it may be the case that a first-time offender is not responsible for his offence committed at t1 (or t2) because, say, poverty or some other plausible excuse operates at t0. However, if this is true, a person’s responsibility for an offence at t1 (or a repeat offence at t2) cannot be traced back to t0. Furthermore, if one believes that the offender at t0 is only partly responsible for his t1 (or t2) offence in view of the poverty he lived in at t0, or some such, it will only be this partial responsibility that can be traced back to t0.​[21]​ This latter possibility fits well with the quotations from the work of leading retributivists that were presented in Section 2. 
Secondly, even if we agree that the first-time offender is morally responsible at t0 for committing a crime at t1, it seems fair to say that most people committing a first-offence would not be aware of all of the anticipatable consequences of committing a crime. In response to this observation it might be replied, reasonably enough, that a person might at least know (and if he does not, ought to know) that if he is convicted, he will be punished accordingly in some manner. On the other hand, it also seems reasonable to say that he might not (and could not be expected to) know what effect the formal and informal punishment of his first crime will have on his life in the future. Furthermore, even if he knows the effect of punishment, he might not know that he will commit a new crime.
If any of this is true, the pill analogy collapses. Let me explain this point in a little more detail. Potential offenders might know that a certain act is morally wrong and considered an offence, and they may also know that, if they are caught, they will be convicted and punished. But they will often not know, like just about everyone else (law professors, criminologists and judges in the criminal court aside), about the long list of punishments – formal as well as informal – that will probably flow from their conviction. To this we can add that they also might not know whether they will commit a new crime. Further, if, prior to their offence, offenders do know about some of these consequences, they cannot know how badly affected they will be by the punishment regime, nor how that regime will affect their chances of staying away from crime, and so on. Some people believe that imprisonment is not that bad, or that it makes you tough, or cool, in a way you actually desire. But once the offender is in prison, these beliefs usually swing round to the opposite point of view. Moreover, potential offenders, like many others (apart from victims, policemen and criminal psychologists/psychiatrists), do not know how harmful their crimes will be to their potential victims. Alternative forms of punishment – or, if you like, alternatives to punishment – within a restorative justice scheme, such as mediation and counselling, have shown that many convicted offenders are simply unaware of the extent to which their crime hurt the victim.​[22]​ In sum, if a pre-offender at t0 is not in an appropriate epistemic position with respect to knowing the consequences of his contemplated criminal action, the responsibility of the repeat offender at t2 cannot be traced back to t0 or t1.
A possible answer to this battery of responses is to claim that, if there is some kind of ‘epistemic constraint’ on culpability, the repeat offender seems to be, at least from an epistemic point of view, more culpable than the first-time offender. For surely a second-time offender knows more about the consequences of his offence than a first-timer: the recidivist has gone through trial and listened to witnesses and perhaps victim statements. Again, the third-timer knows more than the second-timer, and so on.
However, even if true, this observation would not undermine the idea that retributivists have a reason to punish some recidivists less harshly than some first-timers, for the acquisition of the relevant knowledge by repeat offenders usually comes at the expense of fewer valuable opportunities. Let us say, for example, that after five convictions a criminal is very well informed about the wrongness of his actions, and about the grave consequences of committing crimes; but that, because of the punishment following these convictions, at the same time he has not enough valuable options to choose from. Was this the case, it would still not be obvious that a repeat offender is more culpable than a first-time offender. The reason for this is twofold.
First, if the repeat offender knows more – a condition which, regarded in isolation, supports his culpability– this may well undermine the control condition. For gaining the knowledge in question will conflict with satisfying the control condition, since the relevant knowledge is achieved by the sentencing process. If this is true, the repeat offender cannot be culpable, (i) because the control condition, which is a necessary condition for culpability, is not satisfied at, say, t2; and (ii) because his culpability cannot be traced back to t0 in view of the fact that the epistemic condition cannot be satisfied at that point. 
Secondly, if satisfying the epistemic condition only causes the control condition to be partly undermined, or the other way around, the picture is rather unclear. If we cannot satisfy both conditions, we will have to weigh up the relative importance of satisfying the epistemic condition and satisfying the control condition in order to estimate the exact level of culpability. Here I will not explore these interesting, but also very difficult, issues about levels of culpability. I shall confine myself to the observation that if the control condition and the epistemic condition cannot be satisfied sufficiently at the same time – whether you are a repeat offender or a first-timer – we cannot take it for granted that repeat offenders are more culpable than first-time offenders (or vice versa). Hence, if this latter kind of reasoning is true, we have reason to embrace the symmetry. 

CONCLUSION
In this paper I have presented and explained a retributivist-inspired argument in favour of the conclusion that we have a reason to punish some recidivists less harshly than some first-time criminals. I have also critically discussed four objections to the argument that I have presented. I have concluded that these objections are either beside the point, or should be rejected, or raise new challenges for retributivism. 
If my reasoning is right, adherents of Asymmetry A can do one of at least four things. First, retributivists can come up with a more plausible justification for Asymmetry A than they have provided so far.​[23]​ But if this is their answer, they would need, on top of that, to demonstrate that this justification outweighs the reason for Asymmetry B presented in the central argument of this paper. Secondly, they can turn to justifications for Asymmetry A based on consequentialist considerations. One consideration of this sort is that the deterrence effect on the individual criminal who is convicted and/or the general public will be greater if recidivists, all else being equal, receive harsher treatment than first-time offenders.​[24]​ Thirdly, they can bite the bullet and give up Asymmetry A and argue for a symmetrical position given which, where all else is equal, recidivists and first-time criminals should received the same punishment for the same crimes. But note again, that adherents of the symmetry will be obliged to demonstrate that this justification outweighs the reason given for Asymmetry B in this paper. Finally, retributivists could accept Asymmetry B and admit that the punishment of recidivists ought to be more lenient than the punishment of first-timers. ​[25]​ However, if any of these two latter options is taken, it will follow that sentencing schemes throughout the world should change dramatically.
Furthermore, if it follows from retributivism that some repeat offenders ought to be punished less harshly than first-timers, we might well wish to investigate whether retributivists ought to favour a declining principle or a progressive gain of mitigation.​[26]​ These last two topics of discussion lie beyond the scope of this paper, although of course their relevance will grow if the reasoning in this paper is sound, and if retributivism is deemed plausible as a general position.
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^20	  So at t0 he satisfies the two necessary conditions of blameworthiness mentioned by e.g. Aristotle (1110a–1111b4): some sort of control condition and some sort of epistemic condition. I will not specify these conditions in any detail. However, when it comes to the control condition, it seems reasonable to claim that, all else being equal a person with fewer valuable opportunities to stay out of crime is less in control and therefore is less blameworthy if he commits a crime compared to a person who has many valuable opportunities (e.g. many job opportunities). Especially if the capability of taking advantage of the few valuable opportunities a repeat-offender might have, have been weakened by e.g. in jail experiences. Concerning the epistemic condition, the 64-million dollar question is how much knowledge you need to have of the consequences of your act in order to make this knowledge count as part of your blameworthiness. In this paper I have nothing precise to say about this. I will appeal to cases and intuitions to show when, or in what circumstances, it seems reasonable to claim that the condition is not sufficiently satisfied. 
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